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Abstract 
- 
This paper deals with manure spreading markets in France. We focalise on the
capitalisation of the manure spreading rent in the land market. First, the paper summarises the
literature on farmland prices. Then we develop a theoretical model based on farm profit
maximisation from which we derive inverse demand functions for land and manure spreading
rights. We then provide a hedonic application dealing with 7000 individual transactions from
the land market of Brittany (westem France). Land price is explained by land quality and
specialisation, cereal and milk yields. Land price rises when livestock concentration increases.
Pig density gets the best results. We conclude making a comparison with the manure market
in the Netherlands and dealing with future research.
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Introduction
The fateful reform of the Water Act illustrates the difficulties to apply the polluter-pays
principle to agriculture in France. The project of taxing the nitrogen contained in fertiliser and
livestock feed has been dropped, as was the one of taxing nitrogen surpluses under the
preceding govemment. The present system to reduce nitrogen surpluses relies mostly on
regulations and subsidies. Thus, the EU Nitrate Directive's second program of actions plans
the obligation to process livestock nitrogen surpluses which cost can be subsided by Water
Agencies and local governments. Besides its high cost, this system does not incite to optimise
manure spreading via the reduction of mineral fertilisers (Mahé and Le Goffe, 2002). In
Brittany, additional measures on livestock farms restructuring create nitrogen quotas per farm.
Their environmental and economic inefficiencies have been revealed (Mahé and Ortalo-
Magné, 1999). On the opposite, in the Netherlands, dissuasive penalties applied to surpluses
in the mineral balance (MINAS) and the absence of subsidies to manure processing have
stimulated an effective market for manure spreading rights2.
Papers dealing with manure spreading rights markets are rare and recent. Mahé and Ortalo-
Magné (1999) described a system of quotas for mineral elements linked to land and that can
be negotiated on a market. Rainelli and Vermersch (2000) proposed a microeconomic model
for spreading rights markets illustrated with an empirical application of linear programming to
typical livestock farms. Vukina and Woosink (2000) deal with the link between spreading
rights and land markets. Their microeconomic model shows that the price of hog quotas,
expressed in phosphate units, has repercussions on agricultural land prices additional to land
productivity. Their hedonic analysis of agricultural land prices in the Netherlands exhibits a
positive effects of livestock densities in regions facing surpluses due to restrictions to manure
exchange among farmers and that is attenuated over time with production relocalisations. The
hedonic study of Pyykkônen (2003) also shows the positive effect of livestock effluents
density on farmland prices in Finland. Le Goffe and Vermersch (2004) show the economic
advantages of spreading rights markets, with respect to regulations, using market simulation
in Structural Surplus Areas3 (ZES) in Brittany. The price of the spreading right depends on
surplus and on the structure of nitrogen reduction costs in the market area.
In this paper, we seek to approach the reality of manure spreading rights markets in our
country. The interest is to know if it is already an effective tool in the French case and to
compare it to prices observed on the market with those resulting from simulations and in
foreign countries. To which extent is the spreading right market representing a significant
additional cost inciting to production relocalisation ("automatic stabilisation of livestock
concentration")? And to which extent is it inciting to supply spreading lands through mineral
fertilisation reduction? We also look at the evolution of the market over time as long as the
regulation settles.
It is difficult to directly observe the market because transactions between suppliers and
demanders of spreading lands are not always transparent. It particularly takes to the
legislation that does not precisely define the status of the manure spreading renta. This is the
reason why we look at the capitalisation of the manure spreading rent in the land market. It is
measured through the effect of livestock density on agricultural land prices. A spatial hedonic
study has been conducted on individual data coming from the farmland transaction file
'And also livestock reductions.t Zone d'excédent structurel (ZES) in French.
n Doer it belong to the landowner or to the farmer that rents thc land?
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notified to the Farmland Development Agency of Brittany over the 1994-2000 period. The
first part of this paper summarises the literature on farmland prices. The second part deals
with a microeconomic model from which we derive the inverse demand function for land and
nitrogen reduction tools chosen by farmers. The third part presents an empirical application to
the agricultural land market in Brittany which results are discussed in the fourth part. We then
conclude on the needs for future research.
1. Factors affecting agricultural land prices
Since Ricardo we know that the price of land corresponds to the discounted sum of the
expected gains one can get from it. The three major factors affecting land prices are the rent,
the interest rate and the anticipations of economic agents. In rural areas, the rent mostly comes
from agriculture, forestry or residential activities. Rents and anticipations are thus dependant
on land productivity, the evolutions of the CAP, wood prices and the demand for housing and
leisure (Cavailhès, 2002).
Cavailhès and Degoud (1995) have estimated two types of models to explain the evolution of
agricultural land prices in France between 1961 and 1993. The first model, called "direct
model", is based on Ricardo's capitalisation formula P : R"/i, where P is the price of land, R is
the rent from land and i is the interest rate. This classical model has been widely used in the
literature. Here, the rent is approached by the gross added value of agriculture but other
studies used the agricultural revenue perhectare (e.g. Shi et al., 1997; Vukina et'Wossink,
2000). The indirect model is stronger from a theoretical point of view because it relies on the
profit maximisation process. The demand function for land can be derived and measured
because we make the classical assumption that supply is exogenous and inelastics. Land
prices are then explained by land quantities (the market volume), input and output prices and
the interest rate. However, the adaptive anticipations model can only integrate the information
from past and present periods but not the ones made on prospective scenarios. To overcome
this limitation and interpret the subsequent abnormal residuals, Cavailhès et al. (1996)
developed models based on option value.
In their review on agricultural land prices, 'Weersink et al. (1999) show how the classical
capitalisation formula has been modified to integrate rent growth, risk, lagged variables, credit
rationing and the debt level. It is noted that factors like speculation, discount rate variations
over time, non-monetary revenues from land and the variation of the risk premium over time
leaded to put under question the validity of Ricardo's formula.
The theoretical model proposed by Just and Miranowski (1993) restores Ricardo's formula
because it explicitly shows the limits of its use in the literature. It differs from Cavailhès and
Degoud (1995) in the sense that the producer maximises its expected utility, which is function
of its wealth and its consumption. Here, wealth is the algebraic sum of land assets, savings,
debt and land sales taxes. It is accounted for savings erosion and debt reductions due to
inflation and the opportunity cost of assets. The choice of a functional form for utility allows
to determine the derived demand function and the price for farmlands. Empirically, the
evolution of land prices in the United-States between 1963 and 1986 is mostly explained by
prices anticipations but also by the added value, inflation rate and the opportunity cost of the
capital.
5 Supply depends on farmers retirements and not on price.
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Finally, it has been shown that rents, according to whether they come from markets or public
support schemes, were not capitalised at the same rate (Weersink et a1.,1999). Using data for
Ontario ftom l94l to 1993, and the calculation of land price elasticities with lagged markets
revenues and public support, they show that subsidies are capitalised at a lower rate than
market revenues. Clearly, farmers consider subsidies as a more stable source of revenue than
those from markets over the last 50 years.
Another type of studies tries to explain the spatial differences in farmland prices. The authors
use hedonic models to value agricultural characteristics. Palmquist and Danielson (1989)
measured, on individual data, the additional value of drainage and of erosion control. They
compare them to their respective costs and derive the needs for public support. In France,
Michalland (1996) explored the value irrigation possibilities to approach water demand,
without any success. Lacking of detailed information on individual transactions, Michalland
uses aggregate data for small agricultural areas. Xt et al. (1993), Faux and Perry (1999) and
Bastian et al. (2002) realised studies similar to Michalland (1996.), in the United-States. They
got more convincing results, probably because they use micro-data. Goodwin et al. (2003) try
to explain spatial variations in farmland prices by the value of agricultural and environmental
subsidies. Recently, Plantinga et al. (2002) and Patton and McErlean (2003) incorporated
spatial autocorrelations in farmland prices in the United-States and in Ireland respectively.
They find that agricultural land prices are locally correlated because adjacent plots, or close
plots, share the same characteristics.
In these studies of farmland prices, the other exogenous variables are the quality of the land,
or its productivity (yields), the occupational status of the plot and quotas linked to land
ownership. The land rent is not explicitly used, first because these studies seek to explain its
composition and second because spatialised data on land rents are hard to obtain. Usually, the
interest rate does not enter the hedonic price functions because the models are estimated on
cross-section data. Most authors underline the importance of getting individual data to
improve estimations results.
Farmland prices are also subject to high urban influence, which are observed far from the
cities. Cavailhès and Wavresky (2002) observe the continual decrease in farmland prices as
long as one get more far from Dijon (Burgundy). The land price is then the sum of the
agricultural rent capitalisation and of the expected capital gain from urbanisation. This one is
higher in areas close to the cities because the residential rent is higher and the probability of
conversion from agricultural to residential land is also higher. Urban influence is often
accounted for in hedonic studies (Palmquist and Danielson, 1989 ;Xt et a1.,1993 ; Shi et al.,
1997). Shi et al. (1997) explain mean farmland prices for counties in Virginia through the use
of an urban influence index equal to the population of the closest city divided by the squared
distance of this city to the county.
2. Microeconomic modelling
Palmquist (1989) developed a hedonic model that can be applied to a differentiated product
such as agricultural land. He distinguishes the characteristics that can be changed by the
landowner from those that are exogenous and which price is fixed by demand. Landowners
and farmers maximise their profit. The hedonic price function is then the result of farmers'
bids and landowners supply. In equilibrium, the farmers' marginal bid and landowners
marginal cost, for a marginal increase in farmland characteristics, are equal to the marginal
shadow price of the characteristic. Concerning manure spreading, we look at an exogenous
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and fixed characteristic: the nitrogen quota per hectare. Its price varies with the situation on
local markets with the aggregate manure spreading demand. In our empirical application, hog
density is a proxy for the aggregate demand.
Vukina and'Wossink (2000) minimise a producer's cost that rents hog quotas to reduce his
own farm's phosphate surplus, as it is possible in the Netherlands. Our model maximises a
stockbreeder's profit that rents the land from other farms and uses a technology, other than
spreading, to resorb nitrogen surpluses (livestock feeding, manure processing). Because it is
an exogenous and fixed characteristic, the individual bid functions already give interesting
elements to understand the capitalisation phenomena of manure spreading rights. The model
writes:
*Y^1T,. " 
= p,f(X) + prh(L, M) - cX - wL - mM - g(R) - rS
with: y=(X)
Subject to: BY+M: o(,(L+S)+R
The meat output quantity Y is produced intensively without land using the input X at unit
price c. The farmed land L, hired at price w is used to crop the quantity h(L,M) also
depending on the mineral fertilisation M. The unit price of mineral nitrogen is m.
Neighbouring farmers put spreading lands S on the market at price r per hectare which is set
on the local market for spreading lands. To simpliff our model, we consider that
transportation and spreading costs are insignificantu. Othet technologies than spreading allow
the farmer to resorb R nitrogen units at cost g(R).
The necessary reduction of nitrogen set up in the EU Nitrate Directive is traduced by the
model's constraint. cr represents the norm for spread nitrogen per hectare (2l0kg, then 170 kg
of organic nitrogen). B is the ratio of nitrogen contained in the manure consequently to the
production of one kg of meat. It corresponds to the CORPENT norm (i.e. the excretion
coefficient for livestock). In fact, the regulatory constraint has been widen in the sense that we
accounted for mineral fertilisation because the EU Nitrate Directive aims, in the end, at the
equilibrium in the nitrogen balance whatever is the source of fertilisation. We will see that
accounting for mineral fertilisation, which is not really effective today in France, induces an
elastic supply of spreading rights.
First order conditions (l), (2), (3), (4) and (5), associated with the maximisation problem are
solved by the use of a Lagrangean, where l, is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the
constraint on the nitrogen used and produced on farm (i.e. nitrogen balance).
(l) p, #-c-i'off =o
ôhD^--W+Àc[=U
"aL(2)
6 They would decrease the demand for spreading rights.
7 Comité d'Orientation pour la Réduction de la Pollution de l'Eau par les Nitrates.
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(3)
(5) 
-r+Io=0
(6) is deducted from (2) and (5) :
o^ 
ôh 
-m-1,=o
"ôM
âo
- 
"o +1,=0
ôR
ôhW=D^-+f
'" ôL
(4)
(6)
The relationship (6) shows that the individual inverse demand for land is the sum of the
marginal productivity of land, in value, and the manure spreading rent per hectare. Making
equal the aggregate demand and the inelastic global supply would show that the spreading
rent is capitalised in farmland prices.
We also have (7) from (l) and (5), and (8) from (4) and (5) :
r
afPr*-c
(7)
(8)
ct af
B ôx
r ôg
cr, AR
(7) and (8) indicate that the producer equalises the marginal profit from input X per unit of
nitrogen produced, and the marginal cost of the resorption technology to the price of the
spreading right per kg of nitrogen spread. These two relationships represent the individual
inverse demand for spreading rights, whether the cheaper alternative for spreading is livestock
reduction or the technology to reduce nitrogen surpluses.
Similarly, (9) is calculated from (3) and (5):
(e) r
- 
=Pz
CT,
ah
--môM
The producer also equalises the fertiliser's marginal profit to the spreading right's price per
nitrogen unit. In fact, it is a marginal gain from using fertilisers rather than manure because
the model's constraint insures the substitution between mineral and organic nitrogen. This
result, as well as the capitalisation of the spreading right, appears if the model is applied to a
crop farmer lending is land from manure spreading at price r. This is the individual inverse
supply for spreading rights existing for crops and mixed farms. The confrontation on the
market of aggregate supply and demand, on local markets to the extent of manure
transportation costs, yields the price of the spreading right, which varies spatially and has
repercussions in farmland prices.
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The figure I shows how the producer choose is level of production. The producer has interest
in emitting organic nitrogen as long as the marginal profit of the input X per nitrogen unit is
greater than the aggregate marginal cost of resorption using technology and mineral fertiliser
reduction. Producers having a marginal profit lower than the price of the spreading right have
interest in reducing their livestock. If the cost of the technology is artificially lowered by
subsidies, the use of the technology and the level ofproduction increase.
Figure 1. Determination of the farm's level of production.
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The figure 2 shows the producer's choice between the resorption technology and the reduction
of mineral fertilisation. The producer has interest in mineral fertilisation as long has the
marginal cost of the technology is less than the marginal gain from using mineral fertilisers
rather than manure. Beyond that point, it gets more interesting to spread manure and to reduce
mineral fertilisation. 'When the cost of the technology is subsidised, more mineral fertiliser is
used.
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Figure 2. Allocation of the nitrogen resorption components at the farm level.
€
TEm fertiliser
pY
-R +s)
M
Regulations concerning livestock farms have evolved a lot during the last years. On one hand,
the regulatory pressure on livestock farms has increased. The enforcement of Nitrate Directive
began in 1996, with the first program of actions and with nitrogen surplus reduction
progrcms. The measures were not very constraining. The Voynet-Le Pensec circular has
mandated measures specific to ZES, like the obligation of manure surpluses processing for the
biggest farms and limitations on spreading lands. They have been confirmed in 2001 in the
second program of actions of the EU Nitrate Directive. During this period, the spreading norm
per hectare has been lowered from 210 kg to 170 kg of nitrogen per hectare. Finally, the
national pollution tax, planed from 1993 in the PMPOA, has been applied from 1999. On the
other hand, technical progresses concerning genetics and feeding reduced livestock nitrogen
production. The CORPEN norms for hog and poultry have consequently been reduceds.
To show how these evolutions affect farmland prices, we derive the individual demand for
land has a function of cr and F. We consider a surplus situation where the nitrogen quantity R,
reduced using the technology, is adjusted to variations in cr and B subject to the nitrogen
constraint.
ôe
ôR
t
a
N
pY
(10)
8 Howeve., the CORPEN norms for dairy cows have been increased in 2001
aw(cr) 
- 
ôe 
_a(L*sl â'gôa AR ' 'AR'
' 
t) ôw(B) = oy ô'Iôp ôR'
Relations (10) and (11) indicate that the sign of the variation of farmland price depends on the
nature of the marginal cost of the resorption technology, which has to be increasing to insure
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that the second order conditions are verified. Then, farmland prices decrease when the
CORPEN norm is relaxed. On the other hand, the sign of the farmland price variation with cr
is ambiguous. The marginal cost of the technology needs to be increasing to have increasing
farmland prices when tightening the regulatory pressure but it is not a sufficient condition.
However, several empirical studies show that manure processing technology is subject to
scale economies (Poux and Barbut, 1997). In that case, farmland price would decrease with
tightened spreading nonns.
3. Empirical application: the spreading rent on the agricultural land market in Brittany.
3.1. Data and models
The application has been realised on a database from the SBAFER (Briton society for rural
land management), which makes the inventory of all farmland transactions (23166
transactions) realised in Brittany between January 1994 and March 2000. Appart from the
transaction price and the plot surface area, the database encodes data concerning the seller and
the buyer, the predominant cadastral nature of the plot (arable land, grasslands, etc.), the
presence of buildings, the nature of the transaction (pre-emption, etc.), the land's destination
(fa.m or other), the presence of an ongoing lease. Because much of factors affecting farmland
prices were not easy to control, the following transactions were eliminated from the sample:
- with buildings,
- with uncertain agricultural destination,
- with a cadastral nature different from arable land, grassland, productive moor,
- when agriculfural surface area represented less than95Yo of the total surface aîea,
- which were subject to pre-emption,
- when data were subject to statistical secret.
The study was constrained to non-littoral districts, having more than 100 ha in agricultural
surface area, on the basis of the rural complement of urban area zoning from INSEE 1997.
Similarly, transactions occurring in districts pertaining to small rural areas with atypical
productions or agronomic characteristics were excluded. Finally, wo excluded observations
corresponding to distribution queues for price and plot surface area, keeping 7084
observations for the analysis.
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Variable Unit Mean Std.Dv. Source
Farmland price €l}:ra 2925,8 1405,3
SBAFER
1994 to
2000
Plot surface area Ha 3.90 3,08
Arable land Yes:1Æ.{o:0 0,883
Grasslands Yes:l/ No:O 0,023
Moor Yes:l/ No:O 0,009
Ongoing lease Yes=l/ No:O 0,615
r994 Yes:l/ No:0 0,163
1995 Yes:l/ No:0 0,192
t996 Yes:l/ No:O 0,165
t997 Yes:l/ No:0 0,180
1998 Yes:l/ No:0 0,r49
1999 Yes:1/ No:O 0,110
2000 Yes:l/ No=O 0,039
Vegetables % TASA 0,031 0,059
RA 2000Dairy cows density cowsÆra TASA 0,495 0,059
Irrigation % TASA 0,017 0,027
Drainage % TASA 0,062 0,060
Wheat high yield Yes:l/ No:0 0,654
CRAB
2000
Corn hish vield Yes:l/ No=0 0,691
Corn low yield Yes:l/ No:0 0.2t2
Hog nitrogen pressure kslhaTASA 80,39 62,22 MSA 1997
Urban influence index inhabitantslkm2 129,57 201,26 INSEE
r999
Table 1. Sample statistics and data sources.
Note: TASA is the Total Agricultural Surface Area in the district.
V/e explain net of tax, and net of transaction costs, prices per hectare using three classical
functional forms found in the literature on hedonic price studies: linear, semi-log, log-log.
These models are estimated using OLS. We also estimated Box-Cox models using MLE.
Explanatory variables are divided in two categories: information on individual transactions
and district characteristics where the transactions take place (Table 1). The first category
comprises the agricultural surface area of the plot, its dominant cadastral nature, the existence
of an ongoing lease and the year of the transaction. Although the period studied is short,
accounting for the year of the transaction allows to control for market variations due to
conjuncture and especially those du to the interest rate. We also tested several agricultural and
demographic variables at the district level.
The vegetable proportion represents the probability of actually having this production and its
associated rent, which is particularly for that type of crop. The counties cartography for wheat
and com yields has been established on expert's evaluatione. The "small agricultural regions"
classification dates from the 60s and has little aglonomic pertinence. This variable has
however been included to account for variations due to geographical localisation. The dairy
cows density is a proxy for the probability of having milk quotas associated with land. While
being a non-marketed characteristic, it increases the price of the land to which it is linked.
e Chambre Régionale d'Agriculture de Bretagne.
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Indicators of nitrogen pressure are used to approximate the overall demand for manure
spreading lands in the district. Data on livestock have been used to calculate, using the
CORPEN nonns for nitrogen excretions, the pressure per agricultural land hectare in hog
nitrogen, total organic nitrogen and in organic nitrogen beyond the 170 kglha limit (notion of
nitrogen surplus). The fact that few manure transfers actually occur justifies the need to work
at the smallest statistical level, that is the district and not the county, even if manure can come
from adjacent districts.
Finally, the district population in 1999, the mean income per capita in 1990 and a synthetic
index of urban influence, inspired from Shi et al. (1997), are used to appreciate urban
influence. The urban influence index is calculated as the population of the closest more than
l0 thousands inhabitants city divided by the squared distance between this city and the
observation's district. The Table 1 provides the sample statistics for the variables having a
significant impact on farmland prices.
3.2. Estimations results
Estimations results from linear, semi-log and log-log models are given in Table 2.Only 30oÂ
in farmland price variations is explained by these models, which is classical for such an
important sample based on individual observations. Palmquist and Danielson (1989) and
Pykkônen (2004) get very similar R3. For the log-1og model, the transformed variables are: the
hog nitrogen pressure, hog nitrogen pressure interacted with the ZES and grasslands
dummies, the vegetable surface area, the dairy cows density, the urban influence index and
the total agricultural surface area of the plot.
The estimates using the maximum likelihood method with Box-Cox transformations,
classically used for such hedonic price analysis (Faux and Perry, 1999 ; Patton et McErlean,
2003) are given in Table 3. The dependent variable and hog nitrogen pressure were
transformed. The Box-Cox transformed model is described in equation (12).
y(^) = Bx(o) + yz+Ê,
(t2)
où:T(6)-Tu-1
ô
In that model, x(0) is a vector of identically transformed variables (i.e. using the same Box-
Cox parameter) and z is a vector of non transformed variables. X, 0, I and y are the
parameters to be estimated and e is a random error term with the classical properties of zero
mean and constant variance. When the Box-Cox coefficients î, and 0 tend to 1, the model
tends to the linear specification. When they tend to 0, the Box-Cox transformation is
equivalent to the logarithmic transformation.
The different models were estimated using LIMDEP 8.0. The analysis of the resulting
estimations raised two main problems. First, the random errors from the different models
violated the homoscedasticity assumption. The heteroscedasticity comes from several
variables among which the percentage of vegetables, the percentage of drained lands in the
district, the urban influence index and the dummy for on-going lease. Results from OLS
estimators where then corrected using White's robust variance-covariance matrix (1980). For
the maximum likelihood models (Box-Cox), the variance-covariance matrix was corrected
ll
àusing a robust "sandwich" estimator (Eicker-White method). tWe can however notice that the
proposed corrections changed the signification of the variables only at the margin.
Second, the abundance of dummies and crossed indicators in the estimated models raised a
mutlicollinearity problem. LIMDEP has a routine to detect high condition numbers, generally
used to reveal collinear models. Our estimates do not seem to suffer from this problem but
LIMDEP's routine only gives the condition number when it gets to very high extrernes (more
than 105). For that reason, we also analysed our model using variance inflation factors that are
given in Appendix 2. Greene (2002) underlines that variance inflation factors inferior to 10
are generally not problematic. Yet, the interpretation of these factors differs according to
several authors for values superior to 10. Some authors indicate that values inferior to 20 or
30 are still acceptable. For our models, the log-log specification is obviously the most
problematic one with 4 factors superior to l0 (Appendix 2). For the other models, we consider
the absence of multicollinearity.
t2
.'t
Table 2. Hedonic models of farmland prices (OLS).
Student t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, * are for loÂ,5%o and l0% signification respectively
the variables transformed using logarithm in the log-log model.
identifies
Parameter Linear Semi-log Log-log
Constant 1397.Il***
(8.7e1)
7.3015{<{.*
(133.91)
7.4789**x
(111.00)
Wheat high yield 122.60***
(2.60)
0.0282
(1.57)
0.0650***
(3.67)
Corn high yield 4gg.00x*c4<
(1.72\
0.I744***
(8.s5)
0.1125***
(8.ss)
Corn low yield -t4t.76*
(-1.83)
_0.0949{.**
(-3.34',)
_0.0935***
(-3.33)
ZES county 190.78***
(3.74)
0.0876***
(4.3e\
-0.0140
(-0.32)
Hog nitrogen pressure 5.960***
(7.60)
0.0023***
(8.2e)
t 0.046J***
(s.62)
Hog nitrogen * ZES -2.080**
(-2.st)
_0.0009***
(-3.01) '0.0258**(2.36)
Hog nitrogen * grasslands _5.936{.**
(-4.1e')
_0.0020***
(_2.88)
'-0.0794*
(-1.78)
Vegetables 5542.04***
02.63)
I.5647***
(r2.r4)
I 0.0336***
(7.72)
Dairy cows density 1569.09t<**
(r1.42\
0.5551**{,
(r2.r9\
I g.g6g5*x*,
(3.1 3)
Urban influence index 0.760***
(s.02)
0.0002**:F
(5.15)
1 0.0801*,*<*
(13.0e)
Surface area of the plot I 1.80**
(2.s6)
0.0045**
(2.34\
I 6.9233**'l'
(3.7t\
Arable land 188.30***,
(4.s4)
0.0726*x*
(4.13)
0.0686*{.*
(3.e2\
Grasslands -279.04**
(-2.2t\
_0.1936*4.*
(-2.e3)
-0.0130
(-0.07)
Moor _1103.99*€**
(-8.26)
_0.7052***
(_8.43)
-0.7155*rÊ*
(-8.s7)
Ongoing lease _20I.79***
(-6.69\
_0.0359:r€*{<
(-3.31)
_0.0323{c**
(-2.e8\
Irrigation 2169.56**
(2.56',)
0.7665***
(2.e6)
I.9727***
(8.s7)
Drainage s70.39
(1.s7)
0.3027**
(2.s4)
0.3442***
(2.e4\
Adiusted R'? 0.320 0.323 0.323
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Table 3. Hedonic models of farmland
Optimal Box-Cox transformationsParameter
l:0.39;0:1 î,:0.34 ; 0: 0.40
Transformed explanatory variable (0)
Hog nitrogen pressure 0.0493*x1.
(s.e7)
0.2733***
(2.98\
Non transformed variab les
Constant 42.237***
(r2.21)
32.6395***
(t2.eo)
Wheat high yield 0.8119**
(2.0s)
0.6122**
(2.2s\
Corn high yield 3.9244***
(6.15)
2.6432***
(6.14)
Corn low yield _1.6623***
(-2.74',)
-1.0610**
(-2.s7)
ZES county I.7769***
(3.e3)
0.40s2
(1.s0)
Hog nitrogen * ZES _0.0193**{<
(-2.80)
0.0022
(0.s4)
Hog nitrogen * grasslands _0.0459*{€*
(-3.68)
_0.0306***
c3.62\
Vegetables 37.9959***
(7.23\
25.704***
(7.26)
Dairy cows density 12.3l2l***
(7.20)
7.6317***
(7.01)
Urban influence index 0.0056***
(6.30)
0.0037***
(6.1e)
Surface area of the plot 0-1036*{,{c
(2.81)
0.0770**{€
(3.04)
Arable land 1.5627***
(3.68)
1.1 15*€{€*
(3.82)
Grasslands -3.2886:rc{<*
(_2.83)
_2.2947***
(-2.8e)
Moor _12.28I6***
(-6.86)
-8.6197{çr.:r.
(-6.ee)
Ongoing lease _1.1604{c**
(-4.3s)
_0.1154***
(-4.30)
Irrigation 11.4671***
(3.00)
1
I
*{< {€1 8
8)
2.69
(3.
Drainage 5.7046**
(2.10)
4.4116**
(2.31)
l" 0.3936**'r,
(26.46)
0.3449***
(23.36)
e 0.4002{,*{.
(3.s6)
o2 76.6I***
(4.26)
35.56**x
(4.31)
p'z(McFadden) 0.586 0.630
Log-L at convergence -25419.4 -2270r.5
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4. Discussion
The sign of the significant variables is always conform to what was expected and robust when
passing from one model to another. Our discussion is based on linear, logJinear and Box-
Cox 1 models because the log-log model is the most subject to collineaity problems and
because the second Box-Cox specification, while 0 is significant, holds only for hog nitrogen
pressure but not for interaction variables.
The existence of an ongoing lease diminishes the farmland price significantly but only by 4%.
The urban influence index increases very significantly the farmland price while the
sociodemographic characteristics of the district have no influence. This result is conform to
previous studies including that type of indicators (Shi et al., 1997 ; Xt et al., L993). Arable
lands are 27Yo more expensive than grasslands and the moor lands price is 70Yo under the
reference (unidentified arable lands and/or grasslands). If the probability of having a
vegetable land is pushed up to I the price is 1560Â higher than for a conventional land.
Differences in com yields provoke variations of 27Yo in farmland prices. When the dairy cows
density increase by one cow per hectare, the price ofthe agricultural land increases by 56%
which corresponds to a mean price of 0.26e, per kg of milk quota for the average milk yield
per cow over the studied periodr0. The global value of the milk quota is probably higher
because it is capitalised not only in the land price but also in the value of livestock, buildings
and material. An irrigated plot is 77%o more expensive than a non-irrigated one. This result is
similar to those obtained by Bastian et al. (2002) and Faux and Perry (1999) in the United-
States. A drained plot is 30olo more expensive than a non-drained one. Finally the total surface
area positively influences the price of the plot. While this result is opposite to what is found
by some authors (Pykkônen,2004; Patton et McErlean,2003 ; Xu et al., 1993), we believe
that this results is not unlikely. These authors justify the negative sign on the total surface area
variable because transaction costs are assumed to be smaller for larger plots. However a
positive sign can traduce the positive willingness-to-pay for larger plotslr for which seeding
and harvesting marginal costs are probably smaller. Boisvert et al. (1997) evoke this
possibility to explain results similar to ours.
With a Student t-statistic mostly superior to 6, hog nitrogen pressure belongs to the most
significant variables. On average (ZES and no-ZES), farmland price increase by 0.I7% per kg
of additional hog nitrogen per hectare of total surface arca, that is 4.6 €, which represents a
difference of 2500€ per hectare between the most pressurised districts and those without hog
production. If the farmland price is converted into an annual rent with a 4Yo discount rate, it
represents a leasing value for the manure spreading right of 0.18 € per additional kg of hog
nitrogen. It corresponds to a maximum value of approximately 100 
€ 
per hectare in the most
pressurised districts. Farmland prices being also function of soil quality and crops and milk
yields we believe that the hog nitrogen effect captures the rent linked to the constraints of
manure spreading. This hypothesis is corroborated by the SBAFER technicians who observe
the increase in farmland prices due to hog producers and that has also been evoked by the
analysts of the SCEES of Brittany (2003). We have lower Student t when we replace hog
nitrogen by total nitrogen or organic nitrogen surplus, while they are strongly correlated.
However, this is not surprising because hog and poultry farms are responsible for nitrogen
surpluses, and the consequent demand for spreading lands, and because poultry manure is
rarely used on site (Thouzeau and Guillemot, 1991 ; Poux and Barbut, 1997).
to 6000 kg per cow on average.ll Especially true in Brittany where farms and plots are small.
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Mean point elasticities (Table 4) are similar for the different models. A l% increase in the
dairy cows density increases land prices by 0.26%. An increase of the same intensity in the
urban influence index increases land prices by 0.03%.
Table 4. Mean elasticities of land with to selected variables.
Knowing that organic nitrogen spreading is concentrated on corn and grasslands (Cébron and
Ferron, 2003), we introduced interaction variables for hog nitrogen and soil use (dummies for
arable lands and grasslands) into our models. Hog nitrogen pressure impacts farmland prices
differently with respect to land use (Table 4 and Figure 3). Indeed, the price elasticity of
arable lands with respect to hog nitrogen pressure is 0.17 while it is almost null for grasslands.
Grasslands may have a manure spreading value but they have no production value for hog
producers that cannot crop neither for hog feeding nor for sale.
Ifog nitrogen pressureModel
Arable lands Grasslands
Dairy cows density Urban influence
index
Linear 0,1639 0,0169 0,2656 0,0336
Semi-log 0,1169 0,0161 0,2150 0,0312
Box-Cox I 0,1712 0,0115 0,2636 0,0316
Box-Cox 2 0,1014 -0,0554 0,241r 0,0304
t6
Figure 3.Impact of hog nitrogen pressure on arable Iands and grasslands.
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Furthermore, districts with structural surplus (ZES) have been distinguished on the basis of
the zoning made in 199412. Farmland prices increase more rapidly with hog manure pressure
in districts with low pressure than in those with high pressure (ZES), as shown in Figure 4. In
the absence of interaction with the ZES dummS the introduction of a quadratic term shows
that these curves can be interpreted has a slope break. Indeed, including a quadratic term, the
model follows the "no-ZES" model for hog manure pressures inferior to 100 kg per hectare
and then confounds in the UZES" model. Thus, as the hog manure pressure increase, the price
increases less and less. This result has to be linked with the regulations enforced in ZES
districts in 1998 to insure that small farms have access to spreading lands: Compulsory
manure surpluses processing imposed to biggest farms, limitation of exchanges through the
introduction of limits on spread quantities. These measures and the public subsidies to
processing should decrease the tension on spreading right markets in ZES districtsr3.
However, these measures appeared only at the end of the period concemed by this study. The
boundary reached by farmland prices in ZES is most likely to traduce the limits of the policy's
efficiency, which is not respected (see Baron et aL.,2001).
12 This zoning has been revised :rr.2002 according to the CORPEN norms revision.
13 To which scale economies on manure pto""rtiog have to be added.
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Figure 4.Impact of hog manure pressure on farmland prices in ZES and other districts.
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Note : The quadratic form is the following : Price : s+ 0,06234*Nhog - 0.000098*Nhog2. Student t-statistics for
the two terms are 7,31 et 
-5,1 I respectively and c, represents all the other variables at mean.
It is not simple to explain the every-two-years increase in farmland prices we observe
(Appendix 1). It is certainly due to an uncontrolled combination of several factors with every
single effect being hardly separable. The interest rate has varied over the sampling period with
shiftdowns in 1995, 1991 and especially in 2000. On the contrary, the Agenda 2000 reform, in
1999, which planed the decrease of agricultural prices, should have had a negative impact on
farmland prices. Between 1993 and 1996, the nitrogen quantity produced in Brittany
increased by 4% globally and by l3Yo for intensive farming (Thouzeau and Guillemot,lggT).
However, the increase in organic nitrogen pressure has slowed own after 1996. We tested for
interactions between the pressure in hog nitrogen and year dummies, or a trend, with the idea
that the price evolution could be due to the shocks induced by environmental regulations.
These interactions were not significant. The opposite effects of the evolution of the spreading
norm and the CORPEN excretion norn can explain this, as shown in the theoretical model. It
can also be due to public policy for nitrogen reduction, which stabilises its cost and thus its
impact on land prices.
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CONCLUSION
We analysed farmland prices shifting factors in Brittany on a sample of 7000 individual land
transactions. The results are very significant for some key variables and conform to what we
expected. Farmland price depends on land quality and their productive orientation, as well as
crop yields and milk quotas. These results could have been improved with additional
individual data on plot attributes.
In accordance to the observations made by Vukina and Wossink (2000), farmland prices
increase with livestock density. Microeconomic theoretical and empirical modelling allow to
think that it is due to the capitalisation of the nitrogen spreading right price in the price of
land. In their simulation, Le Goffe and Vermersch (2004) show that the price of the nitrogen
quota increases with the surplus in the local market. Hog density is the best predicator
because it is probably the best proxy for the aggregate demand of spreading lands.
In the most densely pressurised ateas, the leasing price of the spreading right would represent
a resorption cost of 1 € per kg of nitrogen, considering the use of 100 kg/ha of organic
nitrogen for fertilisation. This cost is higher than the tax on livestock pollution (0.15 to
0.30 €/kg of nitrogen surplus), but much smaller than the values observed in the Netherlands
or in the simulation provided by Le Goffe and Vermersch (2004) which traduces manure
processing costs (up to 3 € per nitrogen kg). This means that farmers in Brittany push their
resorption effort beyond their strict short-run economic interest. In other words, the regulatory
pressure has some efficiency. The gap with the Netherlands comes from the livestock density
and environmental taxes, which are higher in this country. In Brittany, the recent regulatory
tools and public subsidies induce a strong development of manure processing. V/ith the
investment in manure processing plants being subsidised up to 60%o, the processing cost
perceived by farmers is not very different from the leasing prices we observe for the end of
the 90s. If our results ate correct, farmland prices should not increase muchla but the cost for
maintaining livestock will rely on collectivity and there will be no incentives for mineral
fertilisation reductions.
This work could be completed by the empirical measure of spreading lands supply and
demand, which would be useful to evaluate the policies to control livestock pollution. In
France, considering the low development level of the market and the opacity surrounding
transactions, stated preferences method like contingent valuation could be appropriated.
Moreover, bioeconomic integrated models could allow to simulate organic nitrogen
transactions according to transportation costs and alternative resorption methods at a regional
scale as it has been done in the Netherlands and in Belgium (Helming, 1998; Reyns et al.,
2000) and sketched out more recently in France (Djaout, 2004).
From the econometric point of view, we acknowledge that we didn't account for spatial
autocorrelations in farmland prices. Relying on an approach developed by Anselin (1988;
1990), recent studies of farmland price (Plantinga et a1.,2002; Patton and McErlean,2003)
use models accounting for such correlations of random error using a spatial weights matrix of
distance across observations. This correction follows the assumption that adjacent agricultural
lands share common characteristics such that farmland prices are not only determined by their
characteristics but also reflect the average local prices. Accounting for spatial autocorrelations
would allow us to refine our results.
la The wish of agricultural organisations.
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APPENDIX L. Parameter estimates for year and PRA dummies.
Student t are in parenthesis. ***, **, * are for lYo, 5Yo and l0% signification respectively
Reference modalities:
- year :1994
- PRA: PRA357
Parameter Linear Semi-loe Los-loe Box-Cox I Box-Cox 2
1995 75,4J**
(1,15)
0,0021
0,28)
0,0219
(t,32)
0,5198
(1,46)
0,3545
(1,46)
1996 76,82**
(1.71)
0,0192
(1,09)
0,0160
(0,90)
0,5031
0,36)
0,3r52
(r,26)
1997 320,01*l'l'
(6,84)
0,0939*xx
(s,64)
o,og54*x*
(5,76)
) )L***
(5,01)
1,52*xx
(5,01)
1998 301,29***
6,50
0,1034x1'*
(5,92)
0,1064*'t'*
(6,01)
2,33***
(s.02)
1,59***
(5,05)
1999 432,82**x
(8,10)
0,1413*l'*
(7,59)
0,1358x1'*
(7,30)
3,24***
(5,77\
2,29*t'*
(5,78)
2000 443,72**x
(5,65)
0,1300***
(4,37\
0,1267*x*
(4,23)
3,16xx*
(4,52)
2,r3***
(4,49)
PRAO97 174,74*
(-r.73\
-0,0453
(-1,45)
-0,0734*
(-2,44) ,07,39)
I
I(--
-0,8060
(-1,54)
PRAl03 -524,08**
(-2,01)
-0,1249
(-1,20)
-0,2513**
(-2,49\
-3,30
(-1,02)
-1,92
(-0,87)
PRA358 -692,14***
(-6,61)
-0,2295***
(-7,35)
-0,2497**
(-8,12)
-5,23**x
(-s.61)
-3,49***
(-5,56)
PRA359 -7r4,03***
(-8,02)
-0,20J9***
(-8.17)
-0,2755***
(-11,07)
-5,03***
(-6,00)
-3,53***
(-6,1s)
PRA360 -635,74**x
(-6,50)
-0,1699**{'
(-4,97\
-0,193*l'*
(-5,65)
_a )"1***
(-4.82)
-2,96***
(-4,88)
PRA361 -686,35***
(-6,60)
_0,2565**{<
(-8.62)
-0,3456
(- I 1,1
:f{.*
3)
-5,53***
(-6,t t;
-3,83*r'x
(-6,18)
PRA362 -865,l6*:t*
(-9,06)
-0,2976***
(-9,33)
_0,3850***
(-12,lI')
-6,47***
(-6,49)
-4,55***
(-6,60)
PRA363 -1109,12***
(-10.87)
-0,4063***
(-12,68)
-0,5055*x*
(-16,04)
-8,91x't'*
(-7,10)
-6,15***
(-7,t7)
PRA364 -l 117,16x**'
(-7,40)
-0,5049t'!**
(-6,70)
-0,4956***
(-6,49\
-10,16***
(-4,99)
-6,66***
(-4,87)
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APPENDIX2.Yariance inflation factors for the differenf models
Parameter Linear, semi-log
and Box-Cox I
Log-log Box-Cox 2
Wheat high yield 2,935 3,0r2 2,937
Com high yield 3,165 3,005 3,177
Corn low yield 4,512 4,511 4,504
ZES county 3,309 13,094 2,296
Hog nitrogen pressure ll,64l 3,093 3,241
Hog nitrogen * ZES 1 84s 18,461 5,291
Hog nitrogen * grasslands 9 t4 2,2'76
Vegetables 2,046 1,804 2,037
Dairy cows density 1,097 1,277 1,155
Urban influence index I 86 1,270 1,292
Surface area of the plot 1,031 I 7 1,029
Arable land 1 1,329 1,259
Grasslands 2,475 14,774 2,474
Moor 1,094 I,107 1,094
Ongoing lease 1,065 1,069 1,065
Irrigation I 1,516 l,g7g
Drainage 2,192 2,293 2,I59
t995 1,721 1,729 1,72r
r996 1,645 1,656 1,647
1997 1,693 l,69g 1,692
1998 l,5gg 1,607 7,599
1999 1,491 l,4gg l,4gI
2000 I,196 l,l gg l,196
PRAO97 J 054 3,133 3,066
PRAl03 1,039 1,056 1,033
PRA358 2,706 2,glr 2,690
PRA359 3,964 4,916 4,127
PRA360 15 3,179 2,939
PRA36I 3,259 3,706 3,275
PRA362 3,732 4,539 3,933
PRA363 2,734 3,490 2,717
PRA364 1,096 1,124 r,096
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